Why is Lebanon where it is today?

Posted: 05/11/2013

Lebanon sits in the middle of some unstable countries yet whilst it has its own issues, it still manages to remain a fun place to visit for business and on holiday.  To the traveller, as you land at Beirut airport, the country begs the question why and how has it ended up like this?

We asked our intelligence analyst to look at this question and to give you some background as to why it is as it is. It may help you understand the country you are visiting. We look at the history, the politics and the proxy wars fought on its home ground.  Here is what he says:

Historical introduction

Lebanon today is indelibly linked to the Lebanon of the past. Following independence in 1943, the state was known as ‘Switzerland of the East’ for a remarkable period of stability and prosperity seen nowhere else in the region save Israel. Beirut was commonly equated to Paris, given the influx of tourism, political and social freedom, and a general sense of progress compared to the warring states that surrounded her. However, danger signs started to appear.

Over one hundred thousand Palestinian refugees fled to the Lebanon from the Israeli conflict in 1948, the start of an influx that now stands at four times the figure, and over the next ten years, as the Palestine Liberation Organisation lost ground and was then defeated entirely in Jordan, Lebanon became the new base for the Palestinian militant campaign against Israel.

This establishment of the Palestinian cause in Lebanon slowly contributed to increased tensions between the Maronite Christians which, at the time, comprised the numerical and political majority, and the Palestinians and pan-Arabists. Already politically fractious – in general, the Maronites were pro-Western and pro-Israel, whereas the pan-Arabs and Palestinians were set on creating an ‘Arab identity’ for Lebanon and militarily active against Israel, and the central government was not strong enough to rein in either – December 1975 saw regional skirmishes and clashes erupt into all-out civil war.

But this was not a simple case of Muslims versus Christians; there was factionalism within each doctrine and geopolitical considerations forced unlikely allies (for instance, Syria and Israel were technically on the same side). These, combined with conventional and asymmetric wars occurring simultaneously, multiplied the divisions and the difficulty of bringing about a peaceful resolution.

Through various forms and phases – a Syrian intervention, an Israeli invasion, a multinational taskforce and the ‘War of Liberation’ – the civil war lasted from 1975 until 1990, with both sporadic and intense periods of conflict during that time. The Syrian intervention of 1976 saw the country effectively divided in two – the north under Maronite/Syrian control and the south for the PLO, and witnessed the establishment of the Green Line in split Beirut – while seven years later the Israeli incursion saw almost the entire southern half of Lebanon under Israel or United Nations control.

These constant divisions of control heralded potential catastrophe when any international force at last withdrew. Once-safe security zones threatened to turn into renewed warzones once the stabilising force departed – and so it proved following the part-withdrawal of Israel and US troops in 1983-84, accompanied by the collapse of the Lebanese Army, with the most infamous being the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 299. With the establishment of Hezbollah (see below), the assassination of Prime Minister Rashid Karami, and Syrian raids against Palestinian refugee camps, in the 1980s Lebanon looked to be sinking even further into sectarian violence.

However, in 1989 the Taif Agreement paved the way for peace. This Agreement was predicated on the ideas of ‘mutual co-existence’, recognising that although Lebanon had now become an Arab/Muslim majority country, political representation for all was required, and the disarming of all militias (achieved for all except Hezbollah and non-Lebanese groups). Despite the assassination of the newly elected President, a final successful Syrian-Lebanese push against militia-held East Beirut ended the civil war.  Lebanon retook control of her future, although Syrian forces remained in the country until 2005.

Political path

Lebanon’s future remains unclear. Although multiple democratic elections have been held since 1990, these have constantly been blighted by factionalism and divisions largely driven by outside interests.

The most recent government resigned in March 2013 and has not yet been replaced, while the Cabinet has met only once in the past six months. The sticking points for the resigning Prime Minister, Najib Miqati, were the inability of Parliament to agree on the makeup of an electoral commission for the summer’s elections (which were later cancelled), and whether those elections should take place under existing law or new legislation.  However, it is also likely that he resigned in protest at the Hezbollah political bloc assuming control of Parliament in 2011.

The new Prime Minister-designate, Tammam Salam, has thus far been prevented from taking office due to Parliamentary disagreements over the nature of the government he would lead.

Hezbollah, the majority, are supporters of Bashir al-Assad in Syria both politically and militarily, whereas the ‘March 14’ bloc oppose not only Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict, but also their demands for a veto in any new legislative assembly.

The deadlock has now entered its seventh month, and with both sides so committed to their positions it does not look like the President, Michel Suleman, will be able to resolve the crisis without losing tacit support of one of the sides.

The consequence of such a loss of support, coupled with the extension of the stalemate, may see a resurgence of political violence, especially in light of the upcoming elections in November 2014.

Shia-Sunni sectarian violence is on the increase, fuelled by the Shia Hezbollah fight against Syria’s Sunni rebels, and concerns abound that the inability of the politicians to restore peace and the resentment generated by the army’s crackdowns could spark renewed sectarian conflict across all of Lebanon.

This may also mean that the West loses a tentative ally in the Middle East – should Lebanon edge closer to a second civil war.  Prompted by inadequate institutional leadership, rampant Hezbollah militarism and factional conflict, there is every possibility that she could go the same way as Syria and at some stage in the future emerge possibly as a country with a different political and military makeup entirely.

Hezbollah and the proxy wars

It is impossible to discuss Lebanon today without mention of Hezbollah. The organisation was created in the aftermath of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and while viewed in the United States and Europe as a terrorist group, sees itself as a resistance movement against perceived Israeli imperialism (driven by the occupation) and Western involvement in Shiite and Lebanese affairs.

Since inception Hezbollah’s militancy has been reportedly funded, supported and arguably directed by Iran. The formalised manifesto of 1985 pledged support to the Ayatollah, called for the establishment of Islamic law in Lebanon, and urged the destruction of ‘the Zionist entity’ – all positions held or supported by Iran. Hezbollah was held responsible for the Marine barracks bombing, the hijacking of Flight TWA 847, and the bombing of Israeli tourists on a Bulgarian bus in 2012, amongst others, and is thought to have a worldwide network of members.

While Hezbollah’s militant activities are rooted in the Lebanese civil war, their involvement in politics was first brought about as part of the Taif Agreement. Under a plan to unite sectarian politicians, the Speaker of the House must be a Shiite.  Hezbollah not only represents the largest Shiite block in the Lebanese Parliament, but they also have a history of disrupting the political process when it suits them. They forced the resignation of the Sunni PM Saad Hariri in 2011, and were the key drivers behind the ousting of Prime Minister Miqati two years later. Therefore any hope of a progressive political process in the future must surely include Hezbollah, or else risk the country being held to political ransom.

It should also be noted that, such is Hezbollah’s strength of support across Lebanon, they can muster demonstrations of thousands with little notice and potentially increase the pressure of civil unrest if Parliament does not accede to their demands at any point. At present, this threat is in the background, but remains highly tangible. Such is the underlying political-security crisis that elections have now been postponed for eighteen months until November 2014, considered by some to be almost certainly down to a calculated move on the part of Hezbollah to foster further unrest and enhance their own position.

However, Hezbollah’s biggest influence, certainly today and most likely in the near future, is in their explicit support of the Assad regime in Syria. Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, has spoken publicly of his determination to see Assad regain full control, and he has sent over one thousand fighters to aid the Syrian army.

But more than just numbers, these fighters (thought to include Nasrallah himself) also carry weaponry and financing from Iran, acting as an intermediary beneath the international geopolitical framework and essentially becoming Iran’s proxy force in the Syrian conflict. This in itself could set off any number of chain reactions.

If Iran really is fighting a proxy war in Syria, then Israel is likely to follow suit, and this could spill over into Lebanon itself should Hezbollah’s heartland be attacked by an Israel unable to strike Iran directly, but willing to cut off the Hezbollah support to its greatest enemy’s ally.

Alternatively, the Iranian support might tip the balance in favour of Assad once and for all, in which case not only would displaced rebels flee into Lebanon – creating an even greater refugee crisis and security issue than there already is – but also reinforce Hezbollah’s military and political position, perhaps just in time for the 2014 elections.

In either scenario, it appears as if Lebanon’s destiny is to be decided in large part by Iran and Syria.

The links between the three states are firm and undeniable, and as a state ‘caught in the middle’ yet with the vital resource of Hezbollah, Lebanon plays an important role as both a suburb of Iran and an enabler of the Syrian conflict.

It is the outcome of this war that may shape Lebanon’s future. If Hezbollah is successful in Syria, they will gain even more dominance in their own country. But, on the other hand, if a Hezbollah victory antagonises Israel, we can expect increased air strikes and further covert action inside Lebanon. Either outcome raises the possibility of a resurgence of the Lebanese civil war – but one this time driven more by international geopolitics rather than internal divisions.

Advice for businesses

None of the above precludes conducting travel or business in Lebanon, and the state still remains, on balance one of the safer destinations in the Middle East. Travel close to the Syrian border is of course not advised, and the poorer suburbs in the south of Beirut regularly host sectarian violence, but the territory to the west of the Mount Lebanon range is generally safe. (On the eastern side sits the Bekaa valley, Hezbollah’s heartland, and the Syrian border).

The threat from terrorism in Lebanon remains high, as does sectarian violence, but these can be mitigated against in part by voluntary restriction to the safest areas of Beirut, a thorough risk analysis of the political, military and social situation before and during travel (with live updates a necessity), and normative security measures against crime and assault (such as avoidance of crowded areas, no travel after dark, securing of valuables and so on). Aside from the typical issues of crime, moderate corruption and personal safety, Lebanon remains a country ‘in flux’ (perhaps it has always been) and given the propensity for terrorism, sectarian violence and outside airstrikes to occur without warning, constant vigilance is required at all times to ensure security.

RPS would like to acknowledge the use of the following for information sourced within this article with thanks:

“Lebanon’s government collapses as Miqati resigns” by Martin Chulov, The Guardian, 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/22/lebanon-government-collapses-miqati-cabinet

“Obama urges government formation” by Wassim Mroueh, The Lebanese Daily Star, 2013 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Oct-24/235600-obama-urges-government-formation.ashx#axzz2j6YKuHep

“Hezbollah blames Saudi Arabia for deadlock” by Hussein Dakroub, The Lebanese Daily Star, 2013 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Oct-28/235992-hezbollah-blames-saudi-arabia-for-deadlock-parliament-paralysis.ashx#axzz2j6YKuHep

“Hezbollah: A Backgrounder” by Jonathan Masters, Council for Foreign Relations, 2013 http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155

“Lebanon’s weakening political order” by Faysal Itani, Atlantic Council, 2013 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/lebanons-weakening-political-order

“Foreign travel advice: Lebanon”, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2013
https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/lebanon/safety-and-security

“Overseas business risk: Lebanon”, UK Trade & Investment, 2013 http://www.ukti.gov.uk/pt_pt/export/countries/asiapacific/neareast/lebanon/overseasbusinessrisk.html

“Lebanon: various pages”, Encyclopaedia Britannica
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/334139/Lebanese-Civil-War

“Lebanon: A Timeline”, BBC News, 2013

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14649284

Photos: lebanontaxitours and wikimedia

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