What is happening in Libya? Is the Islamic State is gaining force?

Posted: 23/02/2015

What is going on in Libya with regards to the Islamic State?

Throughout the last week within Libya we have again witnessed an increase in the potential Islamic State (IS) alignment and increase proved by further retaliation activity and world-wide media coverage on a steadily increasing scale.

In an attack on the 20 February, up to 45 people are believed to have been killed or injured within the eastern location of Qubah in a double car bomb attack which was claimed by an (IS) aligned group.

An increased (IS) presence within the city of Sirte has attracted the attention of Misratan (Libya Dawn) fighters to the city in order to disperse the (IS) fighters from the city area.

Various countrywide reports have emerged that an increased amount of an estimated 700,000 Egyptian nationals currently working within Libya may have been seized, although no definitive reports are substantiated. 

The Egyptian government has backed a Libyan plea to the United Nations to reverse the arms embargo in order to equip the Libyan National Army with the weaponry it reportedly requires in order to fight Islamic State (IS) growth within Libya.

In light of the recent release and circulation of a video depicting the execution of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians on a beach in Libya by militants claiming to be part of the Islamic State (IS), international attention has zoned in on the country as a new realm of jihadist activity.

To be sure, jihadism is not new to the country. For a long time now, Libya has been a hive of instability, a place where jihadist groups, tribal militias and criminal gangs have competed for hegemony amid the seemingly unsolvable standoff between the internationally recognised government based in Tobruk and the Tripoli-based General National Congress that claims legitimacy at the expense of the Tobruk government, with which it is effectively at war.

The situation in Libya is not binary, as it is sometimes portrayed. We must recognise that it is potentially far more complicated than that. Militias have proliferated the increasingly fragmented state in the wake of Muammar al-Gadhafi’s toppling four years ago. Some of them are jihadist, some are not. Some are affiliated to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, others are not. It is imperative that the incredibley complexity of the situation in Libya is taken into account by policymakers and observers.

The establishment of the IS franchise in Libya is not a sudden occurrence. For months now, it has been apparent that certain jihadist groups in Libya, after pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, IS’s self-proclaimed caliph, have been receiving assistance from the organisation. Among other things, their propaganda operations were almost entirely ceded over to the central IS propagandists. Moreover, rumours have abounded that senior IS figures, top jurist Turki al-Bin’ali and former Emir of Anbar province Abu Nabil al-Anbari among them, have visited Libya on outreach missions.

During this time, there has been a steady stream of pictures and audio messages trickling out of Libya – depictions of armed convoys bedecked in IS flags and da’wah meetings encouraging support for the so-called caliphate things that have been enthusiastically circulated by (IS) aligned supporters who are keen to exaggerate the group’s ubiq-uity and menace. The recent release of the mass execution video, however, is the strongest proof yet that this support is not just superficial. Rather, it seems that IS’s Libya contingent is more closely aligned with the group’s central command than was widely thought.

On February 12, 2015, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) released a report in their online magazine Dabiq, showing photos of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christian fishermen from Kafr el-Sheikh they had kidnapped in the city of Sirte, Libya, and whom they threatened to kill to "avenge the alleged kidnapping of Muslim women by the Egyptian Coptic Church". The men were kidnapped in Sirte in two separate attacks on December 27, 2014, and in January 2015. Following this horrific high profile event, Egypt relaliated with a series of high profile miliarty air stikes on what are beieved to be strategically (IS) alligned locations within Derna and surrounding areas.

There are very loose reports emerging that it is believed an amount of Egyptian fishermen have dissapeared from the coasts off Musrata, however this claim is not substantiated along with other claims of Egyptian nationals which are believed to be reported as missing, following the (IS) alligned beheadings.

The coastal location of Sirte is currently experiencing a level of (IS) alligned activity with numerous reports of government buildings and media centres being taken over and controlled by (IS) extremist fighters. Throughout the previous week Libya Dawn fighters have moved to Sirte from the west of Libya with a clear intention of fighting and expelling (IS) alligned extremists from Sirte. In addition it is belived that Libya Dawn fighters have left locations such as Sidr in order to fight against (IS) groups in Sirte.

In an extremly high profile attack, two vehicle mounted improvised devices detonated in al-Qubah, halfway between Derna and Bayda, on Friday morning. The blasts targeted the town's police station and the home of militia leader. 40 people are estimated to have been killed and over 80 injured. Later on Friday and following the event an (IS) group claimed responsibility for the attack, reporting that the attack was direct retaliation for the governements involvemnt with Egypt regarding the recent Derna attacks.

Reports have began to circulate that Egyptian Secial Forces are now operating within the east of Libya and have been reported to carry out operations on (IS) locations, as expected mucch detail of such operations are limited however are released from a credible source.

In light of the above, it is imperative that we seek to understand the motivations of IS in Libya. Why expend so much time and effort establishing a presence there? Why not focus all resources – financial, military and logistical in the environs of the seat of the caliphate, Syria and Iraq? It has been long suspected that the IS bureaucracy has looked upon Libya as a source of great potential due to its asset wealth, strategic location and the immense amount of weaponry still present there following the overthrow of al-Gadhafi.

European Proximity

Libya, geographically has an extremely long open coastline which parallels the southern Mediterranean countries within a very short distance, which can very easily be reached with ease by even a rudimentary boat and note that the number of “illegal immigration” trips from the Libyan coast is currently vast, estimated to be as high as 500 people a day. According to many of these immigrants, it is easily possible to pass through Maritime Security Checkpoints and arrive in cities. If this was even partially exploited and developed strategically a potential European security threat from (IS) aligned groups could spread into southern Europe. Given the possible threat and the reduced safe waters of the Mediterranean Sea we could witness an element of ‘piracy activity’ within waters intended for exploitation from (IS) aligned groups.

The strategic location of Libya potentially means that it could relieve the pressure being felt by the State of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria. It is distinguished by its huge size, enormous tracks of desert that are virtually impossible to monitor at the moment due to the country wide insufficient security. Libya’s geographical position from within gives a greater presence of concern and potential for (IS) exploitation’s, direct through some very unstable and porous borders to Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Algeria and Tunisia.

The internal amount of weaponry, which has long been reported as ‘vast’ within Libya following the pre and post Gaddafi era, is reportedly spread throughout Libya supporting the many fighting militia groups and would clearly present an attractive enticement to (IS).
 

Summary

There are clear signs that the Islamic State may struggle to win widespread support in many areas within Libya where it is trying to gain influence. Many in Misrata, which is being viewed as a possible break in the sand and a stronghold of Libya Dawn support, are extremely wary of the militants' takeover in neighbouring Sirte, and have clearly called for an end to the conflict and the need for a political solution. Within Musrata there is a reported clear message being sent by prominent figures calling for an end to the current internal conflict in order to con-centrate on the (IS) spread, elements of which were witnessed as Libyan Dawn (Musratan) fighters moved to Sirte in order to disperse the (IS) fighters.

Despite the belief that the wider Libyan population would not wish to witness (IS) aligned groups grow within Libya, as previously reported the greater (IS) alignment will undoubtedly depend on the internal political struggles and control over the county which decide the ultimate incline or decline of (IS) alignment within Libya. Geographically the current mainstream (IS) aligned activity appears to divide the country even further, such increased activity will potentially expedite the division between the claiming governments.

With thanks to SNE Projects for this excellent into what is happening in Libya at present. If you are looking for support in Libya please contact us at [email protected]

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