Islamic State (IS) Expansion within Libya

Posted: 17/02/2015

RPS brings you this insight into the Islamic State in Libya, written by our friends at SNE Projects, based in Libya. With thanks to them for their analysis.

‘While there is a lot of debate ongoing to the group's true extent in Libya, ISIS has aggressively expanded its physical and media presence to intimidate its foes, appeal to other jihadist groups, and attract recruits’
Earlier this month, Aref Ali Nayed, Libya's ex-ambassador to the UAE and former lead coordinator of the Libya Stabilization Team visited Washington to address the "Islamic State"/ ISIS presence within Libya.

In his view, the group is rapidly expanding and may threaten Europe, though the U.S. government assessment is less certain. Some American intelligence officials believe Nayed may be overstating his case, but U.S. ambassador to Libya Deborah Jones asked in a February 4 tweet whether "a divided Libya" can withstand ISIS.

Indeed, the group has dramatically increased its physical and media presence in Libya since the Islamic Youth Shura Council (IYSC) of Derna pledged allegiance to it last October, after which ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi recognized the Libyan "provinces" of Barqa (Cyrenaica), Tripolitania, and Fezzan as belonging to his self-styled "caliphate." At the same time, the group's supporters online have been aggressively recruiting while making the case for ISIS expansion in Libya and a new strategy in North Africa. This aggressive PR by IS in Libya is of course meant to have the effect of making the Libyan`s think that IS are more powerful in Libya than they actually are.

Nayed is affiliated with the House of Representatives (HOR) in Tobruk, the body that has broadly labelled Islamists in Libya as "terrorists" and has an interest in inflating this threat similar to General Khalifa Haftar's "Operation Dignity," a campaign that has treated extremists and political Islamists alike as terrorists. Conversely, the HOR's opponents in Tripoli the Islamist and hard-line-revolutionary-controlled General National Congress (GNC) and the militia alliance known as "Libya Dawn" are potentially downplaying the threat.

For example, the prime minister in Tripoli, Omar al-Hassi, and the Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room militia have denied an ISIS connection to the January 27 attack on Tripoli's Corinthia Hotel.

The more convinced outside powers become aware of a menacing ISIS presence in Libya, the more likely they will intervene on behalf of those who have a record of battling extremists. Thus far, Operation Dignity forces have been engaged in urban warfare with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL).

At the very least, ISIS has left its footprints in Benghazi, Sirte, Tripoli, and portions of southern Libya. The group has broadcast very little from its media office for "Fezzan Province," though it did claim responsibility for the January 3 attack on a Libyan army checkpoint outside of Soukna that left over ten soldier’s dead. ISIS media offices for Barqa and Tripolitania are much more active in broadcasting "soft" activities such as Hisba (religious accountability) and Dawa (proselytizing), in tandem with "hard" security- and violence-related content.

In Barqa (Eastern Libya)

ISIS activities potentially extends far beyond what has been written on Derna. The group has publicized ‘Hisba’ activities such as burning cigarette cartons destroying water pipes used for smoking demolishing "polytheistic" statues and shrines and persuading Muslims in open-air markets to leave their commercial activities and join them at the mosque (more coercive measures are used in Syria and Iraq).

Its dawa activities have included distributing "medical guidance" in Cyrenaica, general aid to the needy, and sweets and gifts to children in Benghazi. "Harder" ISIS activities in Barqa have included the execution of two Tunisian journalists, street fighting in Benghazi, and gunfights, rocket fire, and guerrilla activities in Ain Mara.

In addition to targeting General Haftar and his forces, ISIS counterpropaganda also singles out the Sahwat (Awakening), a group of irregular forces fighting alongside Operation Dignity who are named after the Sunni tribal "awakening" against al-Qaeda in Anbar, Iraq, where ISIS has its roots. The Libyan Sahwat were likely organized as a parallel counterinsurgency force for Operation Dignity after ASL and its allies routed Haftar from Benghazi in July they became well known during the October counteroffensive ISIS photo essays have since attempted to blame Benghazi's destruction on Haftar and the Sahwat, whom the jihadist writer Moaz Abu al-Barqawi (i.e., "of Barqa") described as an "awakening of apostasy.

In Tripoli

The group has claimed credit for a spate of attacks targeting foreign symbols, including a diplomatic security building, the Algerian embassy, and the Corinthia Hotel attack. Reports of gun battles against Islamist militias backing the GNC fit with ISIS propaganda that undercuts political Islamists. ISIS supporters such as blogger Gharib al-Ikhwan have also pushed the anti-Dawn slogan "Dawn of Truth, not Libya Dawn."

A consensus is emerging that ISIS is attracting members from ASL. This attraction is likely due to the group's successes in the Eastern Mediterranean and rapid expansion in Libya, while Operation Dignity's slow and grinding counterassault has put ASL under extreme pressure in Benghazi and the east of the country.
The competition appears to mirror jihadist dynamics in Syria and Iraq, where al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra has lost ground and fighters to the more extreme ISIS. While ASL's position with ISIS and al-Qaeda is not entirely clear, a growing number of online activists advocating for ISIS in Libya have been speaking of the two organizations as one and the same, praising their fighters but arguing that it is time for them to join the caliphate. 

Others have argued that ISIS expansion in Libya would reduce pressure on the group in the Eastern Mediterranean. A Sunni jihadist takeover in Libya would also counterbalance the loss of Yemen to the Houthis, who are Zaidi Shiites connected to Iran.

Challenges within Libya

One of the greatest obstacles to countering ISIS in Libya is finding the resources and will to organise a strategy and partners. This is especially true given the priority that Washington and others have assigned to fighting the group in Iraq and Syria. Going forward, any policy decision on what to do in Libya should be based on an accurate understanding of the changing extremist landscape.

While General Haftar and the HOR have as possible incentive to inflate the threat, their motives do not negate the general, disturbing trend outlined above. If concerned parties focus too much on debating the Islamic State's true extent in Libya, they will overlook the group's steady increase in soft and hard activities, including its worrisome efforts to recruit seasoned fighters from ASL.

Even if the ISIS militant presence on the ground is limited at the moment which is most probably true, the group's supporters are laying the foundation for a long-term strategy in Libya and the rest of North Africa if Libya is not able to unite and fight this ever increasing threat.

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Photo: with thanks to cecilimages.photoshelter.com

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