Terror in Sub-Saharan Africa - an analysis by RPS

RPS's intelligence analyst was asked to look at terrorist groups in sub Saharan Africa in the aftermath of the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Kenya. So here, we take a look at the two major terrorist organisations in the region; where did they come from and where they are going ?

We look indepth look at Terror in Sub Saharan Africa.

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Introduction

It should be recognised that sub-Saharan Africa possesses no definable al-Qaeda ‘franchise’ in the same manner as the cells operating in the Islamic Maghreb. Whilst disparate terror groups certainly operate below the Sahara, al-Qaeda itself does not have a solidified presence, structure or capability across the entire lower half of the continent.

However, this does not necessarily diminish the threat. Across localised areas, al-Qaeda is extremely strong, and this is coupled with entirely separate terrorist groups that render sub-Saharan Africa, for the most part, just as dangerous and febrile as the Sahel.

Al-Shabaab

One explanation for al-Qaeda’s relative lack of spread across sub-Saharan Africa is that, unlike the northern half of the continent, it is predominantly Christian, and the Islamic faith – and therefore, militant Islamist values – have failed to gain a foothold. One of the few exceptions to this is Somalia, a country comprised almost entirely of Muslims, and origination of the al-Shabaab (AS) terror group.

AS first emerged in 2006 as the youth movement of the Islamic Courts Union, itself a collection of sharia courts and associated sympathisers in opposition to Somali’s Transitional Federal Government. As the ICU fought back against the new government, taking Mogadishu by December and controlling the southern half of the country, AS led the vanguard, responsible for the ultimate retreat of Ethiopian troops. For the next five years, Somalia proceeded to slide even further into ‘failed state’ territory with no effective government, the Puntland region beset by piracy and the southern regions under wide control of the Islamists.

Some small restoration of order was achieved however in August 2011, when an AMISOM mission, led by Kenyan and Ethiopian troops, invaded Somalia and retook Mogadishu. Although this led to the establishment of Somalia’s first Parliament in twenty years, there was almost no effect elsewhere, as the government’s control barely extended to the suburbs of their own capital – and AS arguably gained in strength, given the opposition to the AMISOM intervention and the subsequent recruitment of disaffected, poor and angry young men with nowhere to turn. (Given that the English translation of al-Shabaab is ‘The Youth’, it – and militant Islam in general – has always relied heavily on such qualities in individuals). They might have lost Mogadishu, but AS still controlled almost all of southern Somalia, including the crucial borders – and they would not go down easily.

A two-level war ensued. On one level, clashes of ‘conventional’ forces inside Somalia, most notably the retaking of Kismayo port in 2012 that served to damage AS smuggling and resource networks, and on the other, an asymmetric campaign conducted by AS of terror, not only aimed at causing high civilian casualty rates but demonstrating for the first time their ability, and willingness, to act beyond Somali borders.

The first such attacks happened in 2010 in Kampala, Uganda, twin suicide bomb blasts timed to coincide with the World Cup Final. They targeted a restaurant and rugby club within the city, both venues hosting screenings of the football and ensuring a high volume of people (74 in total died). This attack was the first instance of AS explicitly operating in a foreign country, and making good on their threats to retaliate against states contributing to AMISOM. Yet the Kampala bombs were overshadowed in the public consciousness by the assault on Kenya’s Westgate Mall on 21 September 2013, which brought AS worldwide attention – as well as highlight the second stage in what may be a potentially devastating trend of AS attacks on foreign soils. Al-Shabaab have long professed a desire to take their fight beyond the borders of Somalia, and the Westgate Mall attack demonstrated a renewed capability to achieve this.

What has been the driving force behind this? Al-Shabaab has always held an Islamist and anti-Western ideology, but the prime motivator behind their extremely successful attack in Nairobi may well be Sheikh Ali Godane, who ascended to overall command of AS last year and formalised the group’s alliance with al-Qaeda. Senior Shabaab leaders had always been resistant to such an open unity but Godane solidified it, on the basis that AS had to expand its jihadist operations and accessing the al-Qaeda global network of resources would give it the best chance to do so. There is now an arguably greater chance of AS attacks occurring outside Somalia, given the increased capability and top-down motivation to do so.

With the alliance now in place, and AS remaining strong in their heartland despite the combined Kenyan- and Somalian-military campaign (Operation Linda Nchi) against them, AS remain a highly credible and capable threat both in Somalia and across eastern Africa.

Boko Haram

Across the continent, in northern Nigeria, Boko Haram (Hausa: ‘Western education is forbidden’) represent another face of Islamist terrorism. Taking the position that any Western influence on Nigerian or Muslim society is corrupting, Boko Haram followed the same path as al-Shabaab in that they began life in religion and community sharia enforcement, but quickly developed into a fully-fledged militant organisation, embedded in the northern and predominantly Muslim regions around Maiduguri and Kano towns, taking up arms against Nigerian police and military that seek to restore control to the north-east of the country.

Boko Haram is a regionally focused and territorially limited organisation, with little interest in affairs outside Nigerian borders, although it is possible that they do possess networked capabilities up into the Sahel. This however does not render them less of a threat. Boko Haram’s vehemence against any Western influence encompasses any Western individuals, Christianity, and the presence of the United Nations.  Churches are bombed, Western tourists are kidnapped either for ransom or public execution and United Nations facilities are assaulted – to say nothing of the regular attacks against Nigerian law enforcement personnel.

The success of Boko Haram’s operations thus far has been middling. While most of the north-east of the country is now militarily contested, with increasing numbers of troops being sent to counter the insurgency, the Delta and southern half remain relatively un-affected by Boko Haram’s campaign. Whether this remains the case is dependent on the outcome of Boko Haram’s current internal disorganisation.

Before his alleged death (something which is still very much disputed), their leader Abubakar Shekau did not command the loyalties of all Boko Haram members, and the group was split into two camps of loyalists and dissenters. Whether he remains alive or not, the possibilities for Boko Haram are that it either reunifies and presents a united force once again, or is split even further due to the extant grievances and increased military campaign.

This second option might prove worse than the first – as it would arguably turn Boko Haram into a collection of factions and vigilantes, under no command save their own, and render the conflict more likely to spread south, away from any unifying ‘central command’ structure that at least gives the military a definable target.

Whatever the case, as with al-Shabaab, there are signs that Boko Haram is adapting its tactics and broadening its outlook. Firstly, the kidnap of the Fournier family for ransom occurred not in Nigeria itself but in northern Cameroon, with the captives shuttled back across the border. This demonstrates that, like AS, Boko Haram are willing to cross Africa’s porous borders to conduct their attacks. It is also believed that Nigerian militants met up with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) soldiers in the course of the Malian civil war to establish lines of communication and resource exchanges, something which may very well extend to direct if secretive AQIM support for Boko Haram operations.

The potential impact of this is that large parts of Northern and Central Africa could likely come under the auspices of terror – with al-Shabaab in the east, al-Qaeda in the Sahel and Boko Haram across the central belt, terror in this assessment would see an expansion from the Saharan states to the rest of the continent.

Terrorism Elsewhere

Although al-Shabaab and Boko Haram remain extremely strong in their respective territories, Islamist militancy has so far failed to gain a real foothold across the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. There are numerous political militancies (most notably the Lord’s Resistance Army, to be discussed in a forthcoming article abut the Central African Republic) although these are not terrorists in the purest sense of the word. Where isolated terror instances have occurred, they have usually been the result of geographical coincidence and not indicative of a wider ‘presence’ as such in that country. For instance, the journey of Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab began in Ghana, but the operation was known to be planned by the al-Qaeda cell in Yemen, and men arrested in Accra in December 2009 belonged to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

If terrorism is to expand in any other sub-Saharan country, the most likely candidate at present appears to be Ethiopia. The state is easily reachable by both al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda members coming from Yemen. Last month, two militants mistakenly killed themselves by exploding a bomb they had intended to detonate at a football match in Addis Ababa, and in August two explosive devices were recovered from the capital’s international airport. Given Ethiopia’s participance in the AMISOM mission to Somalia, it is probable such attacks are part of al-Shabaab’s promised retaliation.

Conclusions

As Boko Haram and al-Shabaab so aptly demonstrate, the conditions for terrorism across sub-Saharan Africa are perfect. Governments are politically and militarily unable to mount successful opposition to terrorist movements (and in the case of Somalia the state itself is a failed state);

Somalia and Nigeria have thousands of potential new recruits for a cause which is on the rise; conditions are such that terrorists are able to either secrete themselves in the geography of Africa or operate openly; and terrorism is seen as a means to accomplish ideological, social and political goals that the current governmental framework cannot or does not offer.

This last point is perhaps the most important. Containing as it does only two terror groups of note at either end of the continent, sub-Saharan Africa has not yet become a major regional player in terrorism. But as the governments grow ‘weaker’ through corruption, reliance on Western/international aid and a continuing inability to maintain the security of their own borders, and sub-Saharan Africa continues to see attacks committed across state borders with impunity, the possibility of ‘state failure’ looms larger and the enabling conditions of terrorism arguably increase.

Should this militant Islam spread south from Nigeria and Somalia, it is assessed that sub-Saharan Africa may become a fresh proving ground for the jihadist cause  and render the task of preventing it even more difficult.

 

 

RPS would like to acknowledge the use of the following for information sourced within this article with thanks:

“Al-Shabaab” by Anon, National Counter-Terrorism Centre, 2013
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html

“Ethiopian police foil plan to attack Addis Ababa airport” by Anon, Sudan Tribune, 2013 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47687

“Somalis die making bomb in Ethiopia” by Anon, Al-Jazeera News, 2013 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/10/somalis-die-making-bomb-ethiopia-20131014173143235960.html

“Al-Qaeda’s influence in Sub-Saharan Africa” by James Forest, Perspectives On Terrorism vol.5 no.3, 2011

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/156/html

“Failed states and the spread of terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa” by Tiffainy Howard, Studies In Conflict & Terrorism, vol.33 no.11, 2010

“Boko Haram” by Toni Johnson, Council on Foreign Relations, 2011

http://www.cfr.org/world/boko-haram/p25739

“The threat of terrorism in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa” by Kacper Rekawek, Bulletin #101, Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2011
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=140256

Photo: thanks to ITAR TASS